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2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
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5	MICROSOFT CORPORATION,)
6) Plaintiff,) 10-01823JLR
7	v.) SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
8	MOTOROLA INC., et al,) June 5, 2013
9	Defendant.) TELEPHONE
10) CONFERENCE
11	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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14	APPEARANCES:
15	AFFEARANCES.
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17	For the Plaintiff: Arthur Harrigan, Christopher Wion, David Killough, David
18	Pritikin, Andrew Culbert
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21	For the Defendants: William Price, Ralph Palumbo, Andrea Roberts
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            THE COURT:
                         Good afternoon.
                                          This is Judge Robart.
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            MR. HARRIGAN: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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                         Mr. Harrigan.
            THE COURT:
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            MR. PRICE:
                        Good afternoon, your Honor.
                                                       This is
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    William Price from Quinn Emanuel for Motorola.
             THE COURT: Mr. Price, nice to make your
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    acquaintance.
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            MR. PRICE: My pleasure.
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            MR. HARRIGAN: Your Honor, we also have David
    Killough from Microsoft on the line.
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            THE COURT:
                         I'm sorry? Who?
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            MR. HARRIGAN: David Killough from Microsoft, who
    was at much of the trial, who will just be auditing; and
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    David Pritikin from Sidley, whom you will recall from the
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    trial; Andy Culbert from Microsoft, who will be auditing;
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    and my partner, Chris Wion.
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            MR. PALUMBO: Ralph Palumbo. I am also on the
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    line.
                         Mr. Palumbo, always a pleasure.
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             THE COURT:
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                         Your Honor, I believe Andrea Roberts
            MR. PRICE:
    from Quinn Emanuel is also on the line.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Harrigan and Mr. Price, you are
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    going to be doing the speaking?
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            MR. PRICE:
                         Primarily.
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            THE COURT:
                         The reason I do that is not to cut
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everyone else off, but the court reporter is taking down a 1 transcript. It is not helpful if we don't know who is 2 3 talking, so I try to limit it to one person on each side. 4 You all have written me a letter, which I appreciate, 5 as always, the fact that you can agree on something. 6 currently in a trial where they can agree on nothing, including what day of the week it is. It is nice to see people who can come to some agreement. 8 I'm not sure that I understand any of the three 9 10 questions that you want to discuss. So why don't we just start with question number one and tell me what it is that 11 12 you are thinking, and I will try and tell you if I have a 13 reaction to it or if I need further help. That being: "Potential use of the court's Findings 14 15 and Conclusions, dated April 19, 2013, during the August 26 jury trial in this matter." What exactly is 16 17 your question? 18 MR. HARRIGAN: Your Honor, this is Art Harrigan. 19 We are the ones who initiated the posing of this question, 20 so I should probably address it first. 21 Basically we are assuming, and the court will no doubt 22 correct us if we are wrong, that the jury will not be 23 reconsidering any rulings that the -- factual rulings that 24 the court has already made, and will be essentially 25 instructed on the legal issues that the court has already

ruled on.

We believe that it is going to be important to be able to make actual use of the court's findings during the trial for various reasons. One is, we don't want the jury to be -- I don't think the jury is able to independently consider those issues, and yet many of those findings are germane to its deliberations. Both parties' experts have in fact relied on them in the reports that have been filed so far. It is pretty clear that, for example, in Microsoft's case it is going to need to use the findings to cross-examine in areas where we think they are attempting to contradict the findings.

Mr. Leonard, who I believe is an economist, opined that Motorola had not joined MPEG LA presumably because it thought its patents were more valuable than the average patents in the respective pools.

So Findings 529, 530 and 531 by the court we believe are essentially contradictory to that statement. I am just using that as an example. We don't know what the experts are specifically going to say in their testimony, but we believe we need the findings to -- potentially any or all of the findings to contradict or cross-examine experts who are attempting to say something different. And it is somewhat unpredictable.

We think the findings are verities, and that the jury

basically should be able to consider any of them that bear on the chores that they have before them. I think it is clear that some of the findings will not -- many of the findings will not come up at all. It is hard to predict in advance what they are. Our suggestion is that they simply all be available for use to the extent they become germane.

THE COURT: I didn't think this was a capital punishment case. I can see the jurors looking at whatever it is, 200 and some odd pages, and wondering why they are being so punished. Mr. Price, I assume you have a position on this?

MR. PRICE: We do, your Honor. Motorola was actually going to tee this up with a motion in limine so that we could have briefing on it as to whether the order should be used at all with the jury. Motorola thinks it should not be, for various reasons, largely because we believe the findings, for the most part, are irrelevant to the issue of whether or not the opening offer was in good faith, whether or not there was a good-faith process that Motorola intended to follow.

Obviously we have made our record and will continue to make it on whether or not the court should have made a RAND ruling at all. But even beyond that, given the fact that we have the court's order in the first phase, at

most, it would be, we think, relevant to what a RAND rate is, both historically and going forward. But on the issue that is in the second phase, whether or not there has been a breach of contract, we think that the order is not relevant and would be quite prejudicial for the court to instruct the jury on matters which really aren't relevant to their determination of whether or not there was a breach of contract.

I don't think I am going to convince you on this call.

I agree it is great to alert your Honor as to the issue coming up, but I think it would be useful, obviously, if we had a chance to brief it, and Microsoft could tell you exactly how it planned to use the order, because we are not exactly sure, and we could then talk to you about why we don't think that would be appropriate.

THE COURT: I will say off-the-cuff, as the other part -- We won't talk about seat-of-the-pants. First off, I would think that you have taken leave of your senses, Mr. Price, if you don't think that the order is relevant to the initial offer. Maybe you haven't read it.

I am happy to entertain the motion in limine, which is, I think, how it ought to be resolved. That way you can try to persuade me on the basis of something other than my seat-of-the-pants reaction to the argument.

Those are the Findings and Conclusions of the court,

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for better or for worse, I quess depending on which side you are on. Everything that has happened in this litigation up to this point, and I recognize there has 3 been a change in counsel, was that it was of material benefit to the jury or to the fact finder, before they backed out of it, that if we knew the range for RAND, that that would be of material importance in determining the good-faith nature of the offer.

So I will stop there, simply to say this encourages me to think that we ought to perhaps have the motions in limine due even earlier than I thought. I have set a rather strict limit on the number of motions in limine, including subparts, because I have already seen some law firms' use of motions in limine in a way to, quote, "shape the case." And it gets shaped out of existence.

So that's my thinking on this. I appreciate being alerted to the disagreement. Those are preliminary thoughts. I keep an open mind on I may not understand the I look forward to getting your briefing. put on my to do list here, at the end of this call, to talk to you about when we are going to be filing those motions.

Number two, potential use of Findings and Conclusions, apparently by the experts, who I guess they are Microsoft's experts, Mr. Orchard and Mr. O'Hara.

By the way, counsel, if you are not bringing back

Motorola's economists from the last trial, I thought the
economists were fabulous. They can come back any time.

They were clearly the best part of that trial.

MR. HARRIGAN: Your Honor, even though number two is Motorola's topic, I think I can potentially shortcut that one, in that, yes, the experts named here do cite the court's Findings of Fact, and we anticipate that if in fact the Findings are there and are capable of being presented to the jury as the facts of the case, there wouldn't be any need to have either of these experts testify. When we had to file our reports, we weren't certain what the lay of the land was in that respect.

In our view, this is -- We were concerned that if

Motorola was going to argue about the issues that these

two gentlemen addressed that we might need to refute that.

But we don't need to do so if the Findings come in.

The other point I will make, which actually relates more to the third item, but just briefly, is that the technical -- These are two technical experts. But some of Motorola's other experts do make comments about technical subjects, including, for example, the one that I just cited. As long as the Findings come in, I don't think we would need either of these people. That's the long and the short of that.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Price, I would liken that to he just hit the ball over there and asked you to serve it back.

MR. PRICE: I will serve it back this way, your Honor: I agree it is somewhat related to the first question. There is also questions of whether or not an expert can simply parrot back to the jury the court's order, and whether that is appropriate for these particular experts.

We didn't expect you to decide this on this call.

What we wanted to do, the reason we raised this question,
was to alert you that our intention is to bring this up in
the Daubert motion. If the court preferred to have it
briefed earlier, we could. I think the close of expert
discovery is June 24th. I know that one reason to bring
it up earlier would be so maybe we wouldn't need to take
expert depositions. But given the time frame for the
close of expert discovery, it probably makes sense for us
to bring up our issues in the general course of things in
the Daubert motion.

THE COURT: You have highlighted a large loophole in my earlier order, which is, I forgot to put a limit on Daubert motions.

How many experts is Microsoft using in this Phase II trial?

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            MR. HARRIGAN:
                            I think it is five, your Honor.
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            THE COURT:
                         This is to Mr. Price. Do you intend
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    to file a Daubert motion about each of them?
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            MR. PRICE:
                         I really haven't made that decision
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          We haven't taken our depositions yet.
            THE COURT: The federal government is too poor to
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    give me a calendar system that works. I think the close
    of expert discovery is around the 13th of June.
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            MR. PRICE: I believe it is June 24th.
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                                                     Someone
    may correct me if I'm wrong.
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                         That's dispositive motions and Daubert
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            THE COURT:
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              Isn't close of expert discovery earlier than
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    that?
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            MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, if I may?
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    Andrea Roberts.
                      I believe the close of expert discovery
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    for expert depositions is June 24th. The deadline for
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    rebuttal reports is June 10th.
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            MR. PALUMBO: Your Honor, this is Ralph Palumbo.
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    I am just looking at my calendar. I also have close of
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    expert discovery on the 24th of June.
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            THE COURT:
                         All right. What then do you have as
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    the date for Daubert motions?
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            MS. ROBERTS:
                           I believe you set that for July 3rd.
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            MR. PALUMBO: That's correct.
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            THE COURT: Let me simply repeat what I said
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earlier, which is, I am not tolerant of motions in limine and Daubert motions in which a former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors is argued to not be competent as an economist. I obviously know nothing about the experts in this matter, other than you both have got a lot of money and you both hire highly paid individuals. There needs to be thoughtfulness in regards to this, because I simply will not tolerate broadside motions in limine in Daubert practice. You guys have already strained the court's resources to a near breaking point, and I am not going to have that go on.

So we will look forward to Daubert motions on the 3rd, and hopefully there won't be five of them with numerous subparts for each of them. It strikes me that if you bring up a subject in a Daubert motion, and then try and take a second bite of it in motions in limine, that likely will result in my pruning your pleadings. I am just not going to tolerate that.

Question 3: "Potential use of earlier orders to the extent not duplicated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, such proposed experts to be identified by the parties on a date set by the court." Who wants to take that one on?

MR. HARRIGAN: I will, your Honor. Art Harrigan.

The reasoning here is that there are some rulings that the

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court has made that are not in the Findings and Conclusions that bear on the testimony that we anticipate we may get in this case. Giving you another example: Wе have a report from Mr. Holleman, who was scheduled to testify at the last trial, but I don't think he actually got on, to the effect that, "From the SDO's perspective, the patentholder fulfills its RAND obligation by being willing to enter into good-faith negotiations with all potential licensees who wish to negotiate in attempting in good faith to reach a license on RAND terms." That is in his expert report at Page 12. In the court's order of May 2012 granting the injunctive relief, the court said, Motorola's position in this litigation, that it need only negotiate toward a RAND license, requires that the creation of a RAND license agreement remain an available form of relief. We think, in other words, that that ruling on that motion, and the articulation of it, contradicts what

We think, in other words, that that ruling on that motion, and the articulation of it, contradicts what Mr. Holleman apparently wants to testify about. So we believe we should be able to make use of that type of ruling by the court, to the extent that they are not replicated in the Findings and Conclusions.

THE COURT: Mr. Perry, I think that is now tossed to you.

MR. PRICE: It is Mr. Price, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. PRICE: That's okay. I pronounce Daubert as Daubert. When Microsoft raised this, we weren't sure what orders they were talking about or what issues. We certainly think that the court's orders themselves should not go to the jury. But if there is specific findings or conclusions that should be provided to the jury, that we could propose them, and perhaps the appropriate time would be jury instructions, when they be presented.

As the question is stated it is really broad.

Obviously we don't want to counter a court order. But I think probably the best way to deal with this is on an issue-by-issue basis, and whether or not we need a jury instruction on the issue or something else. Right now it is so hard to figure out.

THE COURT: I would agree with that. It seems to me the appropriate way to deal with that would be in your motions in limine. If you line up some fact or expert testimony -- I mean, it would have to be expert so you had a report. But if they intend to say something that is inconsistent with one of my orders, I am going to enforce the order. I think it is the law of the case, and you don't get to continue to litigate it.

I think the appropriate way to do that is on a very specific item-by-item basis. I don't think you can deal

with it in a vacuum.

MR. HARRIGAN: I agree with that, your Honor. I am not disagreeing at all with what you said. That was the reason for suggesting that we identify specific excerpts and explaining perhaps why we think --

THE COURT: All right. Know as a general philosophical matter, the law of the case doctrine is one that is not terribly well developed at times. But I think that the general purpose of it is that once the court has made a decision, the great hand has written and it has moved on. If you want to change that, you need to bring some kind of a motion for reconsideration of a particular area. And since there is a ban on motions in this case without prior court approval, you would have to convince me that there is a good reason to reexamine the things that we have said.

Mr. Price, you have missed my commonly-used analogy, that to me litigation is like an hourglass. As the sand runs through, the neck gets smaller, and we don't simply keep pouring more sand in on the top. That's my general judicial philosophy, to the extent that I have one.

MR. PRICE: We have no reason, your Honor -Quite frankly, at this point the rulings you have made are
the rulings that you have made. Those are rulings that
must be specifically -- unless we want to bring something

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to your attention, and get permission, we are going to live with those.

We didn't know what counsel was really bringing up here. I thought it was something such as the court at one time ruled that an opening offer need not be within the RAND range. And so, of course, we thought that was something we would propose as a jury instruction as a matter of law.

But I understand what the court is saying. I think you are correct, the best way is to bring these things up.

THE COURT: That is a fabulous seque into the issues I want to talk about. Counsel, I gave you a relatively brief period of time for trial. And I will give you hours, since I found that worked well last time. It seems to me that we don't need to spend a lot of time with this jury explaining what industry standards are, The principle that we are being asked to do what RAND is. here is one that has previously been discussed by the That would be -- Motorola has conceded in oral argument that there would be a level of offer that would not constitute good faith. The exact parameters of that statement, it seems to me, to be the questions that the jury is going to want guidance on in its instructions of law.

So I was hopeful, since you seem to have unlimited

resources to throw at these, that each of you might favor the court with 15 pages or so of briefing in the next two or three weeks, as to what are the legal dimensions of that obligation of good faith, so that we can begin to consider some questions that are going to arise during the trial. To the extent that we then need to do our own research, we will have the advantage of you having already plowed that field up.

I'm not sure that I have done a great job of articulating what it is I am looking for. What I am looking for is what are the parameters of a good-faith

I'm not sure that I have done a great job of articulating what it is I am looking for. What I am looking for is what are the parameters of a good-faith offer, or, the reverse of that, outside a good-faith offer or bad faith, in the context of a contractual dispute.

And assume that the theoretical construct for that is a RAND contract.

Now, I understand that Motorola has never accepted my notion of a third-party beneficiary in a binding contract. But since that is the law of the case, they should assume -- they don't have to agree with it, but they can assume that will be how I intend to instruct the jury.

Mr. Harrigan, you always have the first word in this, so I will start with Mr. Price. Mr. Price, any questions about that?

MR. PRICE: No questions about that, your Honor.

A question about timing. I know we have a lot of

resources, obviously. Expert discovery, as we mentioned, ends in a couple of weeks, and we have a lot of resources devoted to that, so I was hoping perhaps that briefing could be done after the end of that discovery.

By the way, we were going to raise this question ourselves in a motion for summary judgment. Of course, it would also be raised probably in jury instructions. But I understand the court's desire to get to that perhaps earlier than that.

THE COURT: I guess my thinking was that Quinn Emanuel probably has 45 summer interns or externs, and that you could unleash the intellectual firepower of some of them on this project. When we looked at this a long time ago there was not a lot of precise precedent, and that made me think, well, maybe we just need to dig deeper. So you do not have to have your first line IP lawyers on this, I am really looking for somebody who can just get in and take a look at this area generally.

MR. HARRIGAN: Your Honor, we have had extensive discussions about this, as you might guess. Not simply in the interest of being contrary, but we were going to propose a due date of June 14th for a brief. If you want to have the opportunity for responsive briefs, June 21. There are a number of reasons for it. It certainly would help the parties to know as early as possible what the

court's view is on this issue after reading those briefs. 1 2 I don't know if there is any chance of getting that 3 information before the summary judgment motions are due. 4 Obviously the summary judgment motions are going to be a 5 lot more useful if we know what the court's determination is regarding the criteria for proving breach of duty of 6 good faith and fair dealing under these circumstances. Those are the dates that -- We think we can do a 15-page 8 9 brief by June 14th, in spite of having expert discovery 10 going on. All right. Mr. Price, what is your 11 THE COURT: 12 proposal? You said the close of discovery is June 24th. 13 Do you need a week after that, or can you do it on the 24th? 14 15 MR. PRICE: I think I would like to have a week after that. It is an important issue. 16 I would rather it 17 be done correctly rather than quickly. Obviously, as you 18 said, it has been discussed before and canvassed. I know

after that. It is an important issue. I would rather it be done correctly rather than quickly. Obviously, as you said, it has been discussed before and canvassed. I know the court was being a little facetious in talking about the summer associates. If you couldn't find a lot before, it seems like you want someone who is a little more seasoned trying to look for stuff now. Although, believe me, we are going to try to keep our summer associates busy.

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THE COURT: I just think between some bright,

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    young summer associate and Mr. Urquhart, I am going to
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    take that summer associate.
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            MR. PRICE: I will certainly relay that to him and
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    tell him that is the law of the case. Again, we want the
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    right decision.
                     I don't know if there is a reason to
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    really rush it, as Microsoft suggests. I request we maybe
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    get a week after.
                         I am sure if I say July 1st that is
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            THE COURT:
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    going to be a Saturday. Someone probably has a calendar.
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            MR. PALUMBO: It is actually a Monday, your Honor.
            THE COURT:
                        Perfect. Let's do it July 1st.
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        Counsel, please understand, this is not intended to
    persuade me one way or the other. This isn't your motion
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              This is background of what the law is on this
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    issue. You don't have to finely tailor it to your
    ultimate position. It is going to make our job immensely
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    easier if we can begin to see some outline of the forest
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           I agree that it is going to help us make a better
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    decision when the time comes.
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        It seems to me that the real fight in this is going to
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    be jury instructions. That will be not for some period of
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    time, but to help us get started that would be of
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    significant benefit.
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            MR. HARRIGAN: Your Honor, do you want just one
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brief from each side or do you want response briefs?

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1	THE COURT: One brief from each side. Maybe you
2	will surprise yourselves and agree.
3	Counsel, anything else that I can do for you today?
4	MR. HARRIGAN: No, your Honor.
5	MR. PRICE: No, your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Mr. Price, welcome to the group. And,
7	Mr. Palumbo and Mr. Harrigan, I know I have done the most
8	I can do to ruin your summer. We will be in recess.
9	Thank you, counsel.
10	(Adjourned.)
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19	I Parry I Farring Official Court Percetor do
20	I, Barry L. Fanning, Official Court Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is true and correct.
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